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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee^ 
vs. : 
Case No. 20060069-CA 
ANTHONY ANGELO LUCERO, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendant appeals from his conviction for possession of a controlled substance 
(methamphetamine) in a public jail, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-8(2)(e) (West 2004). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Was trial counsel ineffective for not filing a motion to suppress drugs seized from 
another's vehicle and incident to defendant's arrest; and, did the trial court plainly err 
when it admitted the drugs into evidence?1 
No standard of direct review applies because no challenge was raised below. To 
overcome waiver, defendant must now establish that his trial counsel was ineffective in 
The State combines defendant's separate issues into one as the legal analysis and 
factual discussion under both claims are the same. 
failing to move to suppress the drugs or that the trial court plainly erred in admitting them. 
See State v. Coonce, 2002 UT App 355, % 7, 36 P.3d 533. 
To prove ineffectiveness, defendant must establish that his trial counsel's decision not 
to file a motion to suppress was objectively deficient and that, but for this omission, he would 
have been acquitted or the charges dismissed. See Kimmelman v. Morrison, All U.S. 365, 
375 & 382 (1986); State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186-87 (Utah 1991) (both holding that 
a defendant must establish that his counsel's deficient performance resulted in actual error 
and that absent the error, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would 
be different). Similarly, to prove plain error, a defendant must establish that an actual error 
occurred, the error should have been obvious to the trial court, and that absent the error, there 
is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would be different. See Coonce, 
2001 UT App 355, TI 8. To succeed on either claim, defendant must affirmatively establish 
that the drugs were seized illegally in violation of defendant's personal constitutional rights 
and that their suppression was mandated in defendant's trial. See Kimmelman, All U.S. 
375-382; Templin, 805 P.2d at 186-87 n.20; Coonce, 2001 UT App 355, \ 13 (all requiring 
proof of actual error to establish prejudice). 
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The outcome of this appeal is controlled by the search and seizure provisions of the 
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the right to counsel protections 
2 
found in the Sixth Amendment. Copies of both amendments are attached to the addendum.2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On July 11, 2005, defendant was charged in Count I of the Information with 
possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), a third degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (West 2004), and in Count II with possession of a 
controlled substance (methamphetamine) in a public jail, a second degree felony, in violation 
of section 58-37-8(2)(e) (R. 1-2). Defendant waived preliminary hearing (R. 13-18). 
On December 12,2005, a two-day jury trial commenced (R. 31-32, 71-72). The jury 
acquitted defendant of third-degree possession (Count I) and convicted him of second-degree 
possession (Count II) (R. 70). On January 19,2006, defendant was sentenced to the statutory 
term of one-to-fifteen years imprisonment (R. 84-85). On January 30, 2006, defendant 
timely appealed (R. 92). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS3 
Defendant was a passenger in a vehicle that was stopped for traffic violations and 
subsequently searched pursuant to the driver's consent. A baggie of methamphetamine was 
found on the vehicle's floor beneath where defendant had been sitting. Defendant was 
arrested for felony possession and transported to jail. During booking, a jail officer found 
2Defendant nominally cites the parallel state constitutional provisions, but offers 
no separate state constitutional analysis. See Brief of Appellant at 19. See also Templin, 
805 P.2d at 185 (recognizing that nominal reference to state constitutional provisions 
does not justify separate consideration of those provisions). 
3Because no suppression hearing occurred, the facts are taken from the trial 
transcripts and are recited in the light most favorable to the jury verdict See State v. 
Loose, 2000 UT 11, \ 2, 994 P.2d 1237. 
an additional small amount of methamphetamine in defendant's front coin pocket. Defendant 
now claims, for the first time on appeal, that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
move to suppress the drugs and that the trial court plainly erred in admitting them. 
* * * 
On July 9, 2005, Police Officers Jonathan Hill and Derek Draper were conducting 
surveillance of two suspected drug houses on Doxey Street in Ogden, Utah, as part of an on-
going community-police project (R112: 59-60, 133-34). The uniformed officers were in 
separate patrol cars, hidden around the corner from Doxey and could observe all traffic 
coming and going from the street (Rl 12: 59-61, 74-75, 134-36). Though they could only 
partially observe the suspected homes, only one other house was on the dead-end street (id.). 
Around 5:00 a.m., Officer Draper saw a lime green Civic drive into Doxey and park 
in front of the houses (R112: 135-360). Draper could not see who was in the vehicle or 
whether the occupant(s) went into the house (Rl 12: 153). After only three-to-five minutes, 
the Civic left (Rl 12: 60,137,153). Based on his observations of other narcotic sales, Draper 
suspected that the occupant(s) of the Civic had purchased drugs (Rl 12: 137-38).4 
Draper directed Hill to follow the Civic as it left Doxey (Rl 12: 60,138). Hill did and 
immediately observed the driver commit a traffic violation by coming to a full stop for no 
apparent reason "in the middle of the crosswalk in the intersection on a green light in the turn 
4When defendant testified, he confirmed that he was a passenger in the Civic, that 
he and another passenger (Jimmy) got out of the vehicle, that Jimmy went into one of the 
homes "to see a friend," and that within minutes, Jimmy returned and they drove away 
(Rl 12: 180-81). Defendant also admitted that if they had observed police officers, "we 
wouldn't have pulled over [at the house], you know what I mean" and would have "kept 
going" (Rl 12: 181). 
4 
lane" (Rl 12: 78-80,79-80). Hill did not stop the vehicle, but continued to follow it as he ran 
a computer check on the license plate to see who he was "dealing with" before activating his 
lights (Rl 12: 82). Hill then observed additional traffic violations when the driver failed to 
signal for a full three seconds before turning and improperly crossed the solid white traffic 
line (R112: 61, 80-82). Hill activated his lights and stopped the Civic for improper lane 
changes and failure to signal (Rl 12: 61-62, 78-82). As the two vehicles pulled to the side 
of the road, Hill also observed that the Civic's muffler was defective, in violation of state 
statute (Rl 12: 61-62, 82).5 
Hill walked to the driver's window (Rl 12: 62). He observed two females in the front 
seat and two males in the back seat (Rl 12: 62). The males were moving around, which 
concerned Hill, because "there's a lot of individuals that carry weapons, and it's a concern 
for my safety" (Rl 12: 62,70). Defendant, who was in the right rear passenger seat, appeared 
to be reaching for a seat belt, but let go of it when he saw Hill looking at him (Rl 12: 62). 
5The surveillance project was on-going before the incident in this case. Its purpose 
was to monitor activity connected with the suspected drug houses and, when lawfully 
possible, question individuals coming from those houses (Rl 12: 78, 152). Hill testified 
that he followed the Civic because of its connection to the suspect houses, but that he 
stopped it because the driver committed traffic violations (Rl 12: 112). See State v. 
Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1134-40 (Utah 1994) (rejecting the pretext stop doctrine and 
holding that the subjective motivation of officer in stopping a vehicle is irrelevant in 
judging the validity of a traffic stop). See also Brigham City v. Stewart, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 
1948 (2006) (reaffirming that "[a]n action is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, 
regardless of the individual officer's state of mind as long as the circumstances, viewed 
objectively justify [the] action") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (first 
alteration added). 
On appeal, defendant concedes that the stop was lawful and does not challenge it. 
See Brief of Appellant at 14. 
5 
Hill instructed defendant to keep his hands on his legs in front of him, where Hill could see 
them (R112: 70). Hill looked at the other back seat passenger (Jimmy), who was "very 
young" and had "red, bloodshot, and glassy" eyes (Rl 12: 63). Hill suspected that the boy 
was both underage and "under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs" (id.). 
Hill asked the driver ( Brittany) for her driver's license, vehicle registration, and proof 
of insurance (R112: 63). She provided him with the documents and Hill returned to his 
patrol car to run a computer check (Rl 12: 63-64). He also switched his vehicle's flashing 
red and blue overhead lights to the back—away from the Civic and towards on-coming 
traffic—for safety reasons (Rl 12: 64). 
Within a minute or two of the stop, Draper pulled in behind Hill, spoke to Hill for "a 
second," and walked to the passenger side of the two-door Civic (R112: 64, 139). The 
passenger-side window was half-way up, but Draper immediately recognized defendant in 
the back seat (Rl 12: 139-40).6 
Draper asked defendant "if he'd mind stepping out of the vehicle " to speak to Draper 
or if defendant wanted to get out of the car or, according to defendant, if Draper could speak 
with defendant "a moment" (Rl 12: 140, 157, 183). Defendant responded, "Do I have to?" 
(id.). Draper said no, "the choice" was defendant's (R112: 140, 157). Defendant sat back 
for 30 seconds and appeared to be thinking (Rl 12: 141). Defendant then pushed the front 
6Draper testified only that he recognized defendant and addressed him by name 
(Rl 12: 157). Defendant testified, however, that he had prior "run-ins" with the police 
and that Draper once referred to defendant and his cousins as the "most notorious, violent 
gang members of Ogden 13" (Rl 12: 188-89). Defendant stated this was why the police 
must have "planted" the drugs found in this case (id.). 
6 
seat of the Civic forward and exited the vehicle (Rl 12: 141, 184).7 
Draper immediately detected a strong odor of alcohol coming from defendant and 
noticed that defendant's speech was slurred and his eyes were bloodshot (R112: 141). 
Draper asked defendant if he had been drinking or using drugs (R112: 141-42, 184). 
Defendant admitted that he had been drinking and that he occasionally used drugs (Rl 12: 
141-43, 193-94).8 
As they spoke, defendant "was constantly putting his hands in and out of his pockets," 
which made Draper "nervous," "uncomfortable," and concerned for his safety (Rl 12: 141-
42, 184). Draper told defendant to stop (id.). He also asked defendant if he had "anything 
illegal" on him (Rl 12: 142, 184). Defendant said no and volunteered to be searched (Rl 12: 
142,184). Defendant spontaneously turned the front pockets of his Levi's—but not his coin 
pocket—inside out and put his hands in the air (Rl 12: 143, 158,184). Draper patted down 
defendant, but found nothing (Rl 12: 143-44, 159-60, 185). Draper could not remember if 
he actually reached inside any pockets during the search (id.). 
During the "moment" defendant and Draper conversed, Hill verified Brittany's 
license, walked back to the Civic, and returned Brittany's license, registration, and proof of 
7Defendant claimed that after he asked if he had to speak to Draper, the officer did 
not reply at first, but then said, "Well, I don't have all day" (Rl 12: 184). 
8Draper explained that defendant initially admitted to occasionally using drugs, but 
said that later in the encounter, defendant admitted he had ingested drugs that day (Rl 12: 
142-43). Hill likewise remembered that after methamphetamine was found in the vehicle, 
defendant admitted he used methamphetamine two hours previously (Rl 12:71). 
Defendant denied specifying the type of drugs he used or precisely when he used them 
(Rl 12: 193-94). 
7 
insurance to her (Rl 12: 64, 98-99, 184). 
Hill then explained that he needed to "deal with the intoxicated minor" in the backseat 
and ordered "Jimmy" out of the vehicle (Rl 12: 64, 96). He asked Jimmy his name, age, and 
if he had been drinking (Rl 12: 88). Jimmy was reluctant to answer and when he did, his 
speech was slow and thick-tongued (Rl 12: 88). Hill needed some answers repeated (Rl 12: 
88-89). Hill thought Jimmy said that Hill "did not need to know;" but defendant testified that 
he was the one who loudly said Jimmy did not need to speak to Hill (Rl 12: 88, 90, 195). 
Jimmy performed two sobriety tests and was then arrested for "unlawful consumption of 
alcohol by a minor" (Rl 12: 65, 97-98). 
Hill informed Brittany that he was not citing her, but only giving her a warning for 
the improper lane changes and faulty muffler (Rl 12: 65, 99-100). He then told her she was 
"free to leave" (R112: 65, 100). 
After telling Brittany she could leave, Hill asked if she had "any weapons or drugs or 
anything inside the vehicle I need to know about" (R112: 66, 100, 144). Brittany 
volunteered, "No, you can check if you want" (Rl 12: 66,102). Defendant again interjected 
by shouting that Brittany should not consent to the search and that the police needed a 
warrant (R112: 66, 124, 144, 186, 196). Draper asked defendant why he was concerned: 
"Did you leave something in that car?" (Rl 12:145). Defendant replied, "No. I didn't leave 
anything in the car, but she shouldn't let you search her car unless you have a search 
warrant" (Rl 12: 145). Brittany said, "I don't care, they can search it. I don't have anything 
inthere"(R112:67, 145, 186). 
8 
Hill explained that he was trained to proceed in this fashion (Rl 12: 102). "I wanted 
to finish my traffic stop first for the reason why I pulled them over.. . . [W]hen I asked her 
about the weapons and drugs is when I wanted to search her vehicle. And I didn't want to 
detain her before searching her vehicle because I wanted to finish the scope of my traffic 
stop, which was to take care of the loud muffler, the improper right-hand turn, and the 
stopping on the turn lane" (Rl 12: 102). 
Brittany and the front passenger, another female, were in the Civic when Brittany 
consented to the search (Rl 12: 98). Hill asked them to exit (Rl 12:102). Jimmy was already 
under arrest outside the vehicle (R112: 99). Likewise, defendant was already out of the 
vehicle and apparently sat on a street curb during the search (Rl 12: 147). 
Hill searched the vehicle and found a baggie of methamphetamine on the backseat 
floor beneath where defendant had been sitting (Rl 12: 51,67-70,72-73). One of the officers 
asked defendant if the drugs were his (Rl 12: 70-71,146). Defendant denied it, but admitted 
that he had used methamphetamine two hours previously (R112: 70-71, 123-24, 186). 
Defendant was arrested for possession (Rl 12: 70-71, 145-147). 
Draper transported defendant to jail, Hill transported Jimmy to jail, and the "girls" 
drove away (R 112:71,119-20,147). Draper warned defendant that if he had any other drugs 
on him, he should surrender them to Draper before entering the jail because possession of 
drugs in jail constituted an additional offense (Rl 12: 148). Defendant did not surrender any 
drugs. At the jail, Draper quickly patted down the outside of defendant's clothing to check 
for weapons before entering, but found nothing (Rl 12: 161, 186-87). 
9 
Inside the booking area, a jailer more throughly searched defendant (Rl 12: 151,162, 
169-70). The jail search was recorded on tape and played for the jury (R112: 166-67). 
Reaching into defendant's pockets, the jailer found a small packet of methamphetamine in 
defendant's front coin pocket (Rl 12: 151, 162-63, 169-71).9 
Defendant denied knowledge of the baggie of methamphetamine found in the Civic 
and claimed that the police must have planted the packet of methamphetamine found in the 
jail (R112: 188-89). 
The jury acquitted defendant of Count I (methamphetamine in the vehicle) and 
convicted him of Count II (methamphetamine in jail) (R. 70).10 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant does not challenge the vehicle stop, but claims that the ensuing detention 
exceeded the permissible scope of the traffic stop. He further argues that because the driver' s 
consent was obtained during this alleged period of unlawful detention, the consent is tainted 
9Draper was asked why he did not discover the packet of methamphetamine in 
defendant's coin pocket when he searched defendant at the scene and before entering the 
jail. Draper was unsure if he actually reached inside defendant's pockets during the pat 
down at the scene (Rl 12: 143-44, 159-60, 185). He further explained: "Well again, the 
first search [at the scene] was a consensual search, and I did a search of him and 
apparently, I just missed it. So the second search [at the jail] that I did of him was outside 
of all of his clothing, never reaching inside of his pockets or anything. It was at the jail 
and it's outside his clothing. So on that second search, I would not have found it. And on 
the first one [at the scene], that's what I was saying. It depends if I reached in his pockets 
or not. You know more than likely I would have, but - and if that's the case, then I just 
missed it" (Rl 12: 159-60,164). 
10The jury voiced confusion over the elements of Count I and may have mistakenly 
believed that the State was required to establish defendant's exclusive use and control of 
the drugs found in the vehicle (R. 49; Rl 12: 149-50, 216). 
10 
and cannot support the search of the vehicle. Defendant asserts that his trial counsel was 
ineffective in not moving to suppress on this ground and for not moving to suppress the drugs 
found incident to his arrest as fruit of the poisonous tree. For the same reasons, defendant 
argues that the trial court plainly erred in admitting the drugs. 
Defendant's arguments are without merit. The Fourth Amendment protects only an 
individual's personal constitutional rights. Consequently, defendant cannot challenge the 
driver's detention or consent, but only the constitutionally of his own detention. In regard 
to his own detention, defendant fails to establish that his detention violated the Fourth 
Amendment or that any factual nexus exists between his detention and the independent 
discovery of the drugs pursuant to the driver's consent. Because defendant has not 
established error or prejudice, he cannot demonstrate that his counsel was ineffective or that 
the trial court plainly erred. 
ARGUMENT 
THE SEIZURE OF THE DRUGS DID NOT VIOLATE DEFENDANT'S 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT, THEREFORE, HIS COUNSEL WAS 
NOT OBLIGATED TO FILE A MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE DRUGS 
AND THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT PLAINLY ERR IN ADMITTING 
THEM 
Defendant's trial counsel did not move to suppress the drugs found in Brittany's 
vehicle or incident to defendant's arrest. Nevertheless, defendant now claims that the drugs 
in the vehicle were illegally seized and that the drugs found incident to arrest were fruit of 
that illegality. See Brief of Appellant [Br.Aplt.] at 15-17. Defendant argues that his counsel 
was ineffective because he did not move to suppress the drugs and that the trial court plainly 
11 
erred in allowing the drugs to be admitted. See id. at 17 & 21-22, Both claims are without 
merit for identical reasons. 
A. Standards Governing a Sixth Amendment Claim Predicated 
on Fourth Amendment Error. 
When a defendant asserts that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective 
counsel because his counsel did not raise a Fourth Amendment claim, his burden is greater 
than if he directly raised the Fourth Amendment claim because the "defaulted Fourth 
Amendment claim is one element of proof of his Sixth Amendment claim." Kimmelman v. 
Morrison, All U.S. 365, 374-75 (1986). Thus, to succeed on a Sixth Amendment claim 
predicated on the Fourth Amendment, a defendant must not only establish that his counsel 
was deficient in not filing a motion to suppress, but that the motion if filed, would have been 
successful and resulted in suppression. Id. 
"Although it is frequently invoked in criminal trials, the Fourth Amendment is not a 
trial right . . . [but] pertains to all citizens". Id, at 374. "The gravamen of a Fourth 
Amendment claim is that the complainant's legitimate expectation of privacy has been 
violated by an illegal search or seizure." Id. (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 
(1967)). To succeed on a Fourth Amendment claim, "the complainant need prove only that 
the search or seizure was illegal and that it violated his reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the item or place at issue." Id. (citing Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98,104 (1980). See 
also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 139-143 (1978); State v. James, 2000 UT 80,1f 9, 13 
P.3d. 576. 
In contrast, the right to counsel found in the Sixth Amendment applies only to 
12 
criminal defendants and "assures the fairness, and thus the legitimacy, of our adversary 
process. The essence of an ineffective-assistance claim is that counsel's unprofessional 
errors so upset the adversarial balance between defense and prosecution that the trial was 
rendered unfair and the verdict rendered suspect." Kimmelman, All U.S. at 374 (citing 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668. 686 (1984)) (other citations omitted). To prevail 
on a Sixth Amendment ineffective counsel claim, a defendant must demonstrate that his trial 
counsel's performance "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" and that, but for 
counsel's deficient performance, "there exists a reasonable probability that . . . the result of 
the proceeding would have been different. Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 & 694). 
Accord State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186-87 (Utah 1990). 
However, where, as here, "defense counsel's failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment 
claim competently is the principal allegation of ineffectiveness," a defendant has an 
additional burden. Kimmelman, All U.S. at 375. As an element of his Sixth Amendment 
claim, he "must also prove that his Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious and that there is 
a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different absent the excludable 
evidence in order to demonstrate actual prejudice." Id. See also United States v. Johnson, 
707 F.2d 317, 320 (8th Cir. 1983) (recognizing that a defendant may only establish that his 
counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress, if the defendant also 
establishes that the suppression motion, if made, "would have been successful"); Templin, 
805 P.2d at 186 n.20 (recognizing that "[i]n ineffective assistance claims alleging a 
deficiency in attorney performance, the defendant must affirmatively prove prejudice"). 
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In this case, defendant claims that his counsel was ineffective for not moving to 
suppress the drugs discovered in the vehicle for two reasons. "First, after the officer arrested 
the passenger on a warrant, the officer continued to detain the driver while he asked for 
permission to search the vehicle. Second, the officer asked the Defendant to get out of the 
vehicle, and then commenced to ask him questions about drug usage." Br.Apit. at 15. 
According to defendant, these allegedly illegal detentions tainted the driver's consent to 
search and rendered the ensuing search of the vehicle illegal. And because the drugs 
discovered in the vehicle search constituted the basis for defendant's arrest, the drugs found 
incident to that arrest must be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. See Br.Apit. at 16-17 
(citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963)). 
Applying the appropriate legal standards, to prevail on his ineffective-assistance 
claim, defendant must now establish: 
(1) he was illegally detained in violation of the Fourth Amendment; 
(2) his own illegal detention tainted the driver's otherwise voluntary consent 
to search; and 
(3) if his trial counsel had filed a motion to suppress on this ground, 
suppression of the drugs discovered in the vehicle and incident to arrest would 
have been granted and dismissal or acquittal would have resulted. 
See Kimmelman, All U.S. at 374-375. 
Defendant also asserts that the trial court committed plain error in failing to sua sponte 
suppress the drugs when counsel did not move to suppress. See Br.Apit. at 17 & 19. To 
prevail on nis plain error claim, defendant must establish that actual error occurred at trial, 
that the error should have been obvious to the trial court, and that absent the error, there 
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exists a reasonable likelihood that the result of the trial would have been different. See State 
v. Co once, 2001 UT App 355,^j8,36P.3d533. The prejudice prong of plain error and 
ineffective-assistance analysis is identical. See id. at ^[ 12-13. See also State v. Ellifritz, 
835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah App. 1992) (recognizing that both tests embrace a common 
standard). Consequently, to establish plain error, defendant must likewise establish an actual 
Fourth Amendment violation.11 
Given the symmetry of plain error and ineffective-assistance analysis, that State 
addresses defendant's Fourth Amendment argument only in the context of his Sixth 
Amendment claim. Defeat of that claim necessarily negates defendant's plain error claim. 
B. Defendant May Challenge Only Violations of His Own 
Constitutional Rights. 
Below, defense counsel recognized that defendant could challenge only violations of 
his own constitutional rights and not those of the driver (Rl 12: 201). See Rakas, 439 U.S. 
at 139-43 (approving the "expectation of privacy" requirement first recognized in Katz, 389 
U.S. at 3 51 -53). Now, on appeal, defendant attempts to circumvent this fundamental Fourth 
1
 defendant asserts that because his claims are based on the Fourth Amendment, 
any error must be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Br.Aplt. at 17 & 19. The 
United States Supreme Court held otherwise: "[W]hen an attorney chooses to default a 
Fourth Amendment claim, he also loses the opportunity to obtain direct review under the 
harmless-error standard of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, [(1967)], which requires 
the State to prove that the defendant was not prejudiced by the error [beyond a reasonable 
doubt]. By defaulting, counsel shifts the burden to defendant to prove that there exists a 
reasonable probability that, absent his attorney's incompetence, he would not have been 
convicted." Kimmelman, All U.S. at 382 n.7. See also State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 351, 
359 (Utah App. 1993) (applying "reasonable probability" standard in context of 
ineffective-assistance claim based on a failure to file a motion to suppress). 
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Amendment tenet and challenge the validity of the driver's consent to search by 
impermissibly claiming it was tainted by both the driver's and defendant's allegedly unlawful 
detentions. See Br.Aplt. at 14-17. Though defendant may challenge the validity of his own 
detention, he may not vicariously assert a violation of another's constitutional rights. 
In Rakas, the United States Supreme Court addressed a Fourth Amendment claim in 
a factual context similar to the present case. 439 U.S. at 130-31. Like defendant here, Rakas 
was a passenger in a vehicle that was lawfully stopped. Id. at 130. The vehicle was searched 
and weapons discovered in the glove compartment and near the passenger seat where Rakas 
had been sitting. Id. Rakas attempted to challenge the search as lacking probable cause. Id. 
at 131. The state appellate court held that Rakas lacked "standing" to challenge the search 
of the vehicle because he was neither its driver or owner.12 Id. at 132. The United States 
Supreme Court agreed and, in the process, re-emphasized that Fourth Amendment rights 
were personal rights, which '"may not be vicariously asserted'": 
A person who is aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through the 
introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search of a third person's 
premises or property has not had any of his Fourth Amendment rights 
infringed. And since the exclusionary rule is an attempt to effectuate the 
guarantees of the Fourth Amendment... it is proper to permit only defendants 
whose Fourth Amendment rights have been violated to benefit from the rule's 
protections. 
12The term "standing" is a misnomer in the context of a Fourth Amendment claim. 
See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 139, 143 & n.12. See also Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 87-
88(1988) (reiterating "that in determining whether a defendant is able to show the 
violation of his (and not someone else's) Fourth Amendment rights, the definition of 
those rights is more properly placed within the purview of substantive Fourth Amendment 
law than within that of standing") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Id. at 133-34 (citations omitted). The Court held that the Fourth Amendment is not violated 
unless a defendant establishes not only that an illegality occurred, but also that the illegality 
violated his own "legitimate expectation of privacy" in the place searched or item seized. 
Id. at 143-44. Accord James, 2000 UT 80, \ 9. 
In the ensuing thirty years, courts have consistently interpreted Rakas to bar a 
passenger from challenging the driver's detention or consent to search. See United States 
v. Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491, 1499-1500 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Eylicio-Montoya, 
70 F.3d 1158, 1162 (10th Cir. 1995) (citing Rakas and numerous federal court decisions 
which recognize that a "passenger qua passenger" has no reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the vehicle to permit a direct challenge of the search of the vehicle or detention of the 
other occupants). See also Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth 
Amendment, § 11(e), at 219-220 (4th ed. 2004). 
Likewise, in this case, defendant is barred from claiming constitutional violations 
based on Brittany's detention or the validity of her consent to search. But even if defendant 
could legitimately challenge Brittany's detention or consent directly, the challenge would be 
without merit. 
Defendant does not dispute that Officer Hill observed Brittany commit multiple traffic 
violations and lawfully stopped her vehicle. See BrAplt. at 14. Hill then immediately 
observed Jimmy in the backseat and reasonably suspected him of being a minor under the 
influence of alcohol or drugs. See Statement of Facts, supra. This reasonable suspicion 
permitted Hill to extend the scope of the traffic stop to include an investigation of Jimmy. 
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See State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431,435 (Utah App. 1990) (holding that a traffic stop may 
be lawfully extended when reasonable suspicion of another crime exists). HilPs 
investigations of Brittany and Jimmy were completed before he asked Brittany if she had 
anything "[he] need[ed] to know about" in her vehicle. See Statement of Facts, supra. 
Moreover, Hill did not ask the question until he had returned Brittany's documents to her, 
informed her that no citation would be issued, and told her that she was free to leave. See 
Statement of Facts, supra. See also Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 36 & 39-40 (1996) 
(rejecting a "bright-line" requirement that an officer inform a driver that she is "free to leave" 
before asking for consent to search the vehicle). Accord United States v. Sanchez-Pena, 336 
F.3d 431, 442-443 (5th Cir. 2003 (citing Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals' decisions applying Robinette and concluding that when a driver's documents are 
returned and she is warned or cited for traffic violations, the traffic stop is completed and a 
consensual encounter begins); State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ^ f 37,63 P.3d 650 (recognizing 
that a traffic stop may "de-escalate to a consensual encounter" and that when it does, 
"questioning during such an encounter is lawful, regardless of scope, as long as the person 
remains a willing participant"). Consequently, the facts surrounding Brittany's initial 
detention and subsequent consent to search provide no basis for suppression—especially in 
light of the statement that she was "free to leave." See cases, supra (all noting that an officer 
is not required to tell a detainee that she is "free to leave," the statement provides a clear 
demarcation that the detention has de-escalated to a consensual encounter). 
Though defendant is barred from challenging Brittany's detention or consent directly, 
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he may challenge the vehicle stop and/or his own ensuing detention. See United States v. 
DeLuca, 269 F.3d 1128, 1131-34 (10th Cir. 2001); Shareef, 100 F.2d at 1500; Eylicio-
Montoya, 70 F.3d at 1163-64. As will be discussed, defendant concedes the validity of the 
stop in this case. He contends only that his detention was unlawful. But even assuming 
arguendo this was true, defendant must establish not only that his detention was illegal, but 
that but for his illegal detention, the consent search of the vehicle would not have occurred. 
Without a nexus between the illegality and discovery of the drugs, defendant cannot claim 
prejudice nor establish that his counsel was ineffective or the trial court plainly erred. 
C. The Stop of the Vehicle was Lawful. 
Defendant concedes that the stop of the vehicle was lawful and that he has no grounds 
to challenge it. See Br.Aplt. at 14 & n.l. 
Officer Hill observed Brittany commit multiple traffic violations and stopped her 
vehicle. See Statement of Facts, supra. Even though Hill readily admitted that he followed 
the vehicle hoping to find a legitimate reason to stop it, it is uncontroverted that the traffic 
violations he observed constituted that legitimate reason. See id. See also State v. Lopez, 
873P.2dll27,1134-40 (Utah 1994) (holding that observed traffic violations justify a stop, 
regardless of the subjective motivation of the officer). In sum, there are no grounds to 
challenge the stop and a motion to suppress on this ground would have been futile. Counsel, 
therefore, was not obligated to file one. SeeStatev. Whittle, 1999 UT 96,^34,989 P.2d 52; 
State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12, 15 (Utah App. 1988) (both recognizing that counsel is not 
ineffective for failing to raise futile motions or objections). 
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D. Defendant's Detention Was Lawful; and, in Any Case, No 
Nexus Exists Between that Detention and the Independent 
Discovery of Drugs Which Resulted in His Arrest. 
Defendant claims that he was unlawfully detained when Officer Draper "asked the 
Defendant to get out of the vehicle, and then commenced to ask him questions about drug 
usage." See Br.Aplt. at 15. He further argues that because he was impermissibly seized 
when Brittany consented, her consent is invalid and the search of her vehicle illegal. See 
id. at 16-17. The claim has no merit. 
Passengers in a lawfully stopped vehicle may be ordered to exit the vehicle pending 
completion ofthe traffic stop. See Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408,414-15 (1997). Here, 
defendant was a passenger in a vehicle that was lawfully stopped. See Br.Aplt. at 14. He 
was asked to exit the vehicle within a minute or two of that lawful stop and while Hill was 
still verifying the driver's information. See Statement of Facts, supra. Draper then conversed 
with defendant. On appeal, defendant contends the exit from the vehicle and, primarily, the 
resultant question(s) from Draper impermissibly prolonged defendant's detention. See 
Br.Aplt. at 14-17. The contention is neither legally or factually supportable. 
Draper requested to speak to defendant only a minute or two after the initial stop and 
before the traffic stop or investigation of Jimmy was completed. See Statement of Facts, 
supra. Thus, defendant's exit from the vehicle did not extend the detention, it only 
permissibly changed its location from inside to outside the vehicle. See Wilson, 519 U.S. at 
413-14 (recognizing de mininus intrusion involved in ordering occupants to exit a lawfully 
stopped vehicle). 
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Once defendant exited the vehicle, Draper observed signs that defendant was under 
the influence of drugs or alcohol (Rl 12:141-43,184). Defendant does not acknowledge this 
fact and ignores the significance of the related fact that Jimmy, seated next to defendant, 
appeared to be a minor under the influence of drugs or alcohol. See Statement of Facts, 
supra. The reasonable inferences from these facts is that defendant was intoxicated and that 
he had contributed to the intoxication of the minor.13 This provided Draper a reasonable 
basis to ask defendant if he had any drugs or alcohol on his person. See United States v. 
Arvizu, 524 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (reaffirming that reasonable suspicion is based on the 
"totality of the circumstances," including an officer's "own experience and specialized 
training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available 
to them that might well elude an untrained person") (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
In any case, reasonable suspicion was not required to support Draper's question 
because the question did not extend the period of defendant's legitimate detention or expand 
its legitimate scope. SeeMuehler v. Menu, 544 U.S. 93,101 (2005) (reaffirming that "mere 
police questioning does not constitute a seizure" and, therefore, "[e]ven when officers have 
no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may generally ask questions of that 
individual") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
13These inferences are drawn from the existing record. Necessarily, the trial 
testimony did not examine all circumstances of the detention, but focused on the 
substantive crimes. Nevertheless, defendant bears the burden to prove as a element of his 
Sixth Amendment claim that an actual Fourth Amendment violation occurred, that is, that 
no facts taken with their reasonable inferences justified his detention. See Kimmelman, 
477 U.S. at 375-75. 
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In sum, defendant was not illegally detained. But even if arguendo he was, defendant 
must still establish a factual nexus between that illegality and the discovery of the drugs. 
Without a nexus, defendant cannot prove prejudice from the illegal detention and, 
consequently, cannot demonstrate that his counsel was ineffective or that the trial court 
plainly erred. 
As previously discussed, it is well-recognized that a defendant, who is a passenger in 
a lawfully stopped vehicle, 
may lack the requisite possessory or ownership interest in a vehicle to directly 
challenge a search of that vehicle, [but] may nevertheless contest the 
lawfulness of his own detention and seek to suppress evidence found in the 
vehicle as the fruit of the illegal detention. To successfully suppress evidence 
as the fruit of an unlawful detention, a defendant must first establish that the 
detention did violate his Fourth Amendment rights. The defendant then bears 
the burden of demonstrating a factual nexus between the illegality and the 
challenged evidence. Only if the defendant has made these two showings must 
the government prove that the evidence sought to be suppressed is not fruit of 
the poisonous tree either by demonstrating the evidence would have been 
inevitably discovered, was discovered through independent means, or was so 
attenuated from the illegality as to dissipate the taint of the unlawful conduct. 
. . . At a minimum, a defendant must adduce evidence at the suppression 
hearing showing that evidence sought to be suppressed would not have come 
to light but for the government's unconstitutional conduct. 
United States v. Nava-Ramirez, 210 F.3d 1128, 1131 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 531 U.S. 887 
(2000) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Accord United States v. Ladeaux, 454 F. 
3d 1107, 1110-11 (10th Cir. 2006); DeLuca, 269 F.3d at 1131-34. 
In this case, defendant's detention did not result in the discovery of any evidence. 
Defendant exited the vehicle, spoke to Draper, denied drugs or alcohol were on him, 
volunteered to be searched, and was patted down without result. See Statement of Facts, 
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supra. Contemporaneously, but independently, Brittany was given back her license and other 
documents, told she would not be cited, and instructed that she was free to leave. See 
Statement of Facts, supra. Even if, therefore, defendant established that he was unlawfully 
detained at this point, Brittany was not. See Subsection B, supra. 
Moreover, defendant's detention had no effect on Brittany's decision to consent. To 
the contrary, defendant shouted at her not to consent, to which Brittany responded, "I don't 
care, they can search it. I don't have anything in there" (Rl 12: 67, 145, 186). Under these 
circumstances, defendant cannot claim that any illegality that violated his constitutional 
rights tainted the consensual search of the vehicle. 
In sum, defendant has failed to establish that he was unlawfully detained or that but 
for that alleged illegality, the drugs "would not have come to light." Nava-Ramirez, 210 
F.3d at 1131. Because defendant's Fourth Amendment claim lacks merit, he cannot establish 
that his counsel was ineffective in not moving to suppress the drugs or that the trial court 
plainly erred in admitting them. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that defendant's conviction 
be affirmed. 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUEST 
The State requests oral argument. "[0]ral argument is a tool for assisting the appellate 
court in its decision making process," Perez-Llamas v. Utah Court of Appeals, 2005 UT 18, 
f 10, 110 P.3d 706, and "the only opportunity for a dialogue between the litigant and the 
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bench." Moles v. Regents of University of California, 654 P.2d 740, 743 (Cal. 1982). In 
the case at bar, the decisional process would "be significantly aided by oral argument." Utah 
R. App. P. 29(a). 
Respectfully submitted this ($& day of August, 2006. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
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Assistant Attorney General 
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Addendum 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
Amendment IV. Search and seizure 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
Amendment VI. Jury trial for crimes and procedural rights 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime 
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascer-
tained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence. 
